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Arguments in Support of a Constitutional 
Right to Atmospheric Integrity 
ELIZABETH FULLER VALENTINE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The overwhelming scientific consensus is that, due to human 
activity, the global climate is changing in a manner that will be 
disruptive to human and ecological communities.1  While climate 
change has been described as “one of the defining issues of our 
 
        Elizabeth Fuller Valentine is a 2014 cum laude graduate of the University 
of Maine School of Law. She is licensed to practice in Maine and Massachusetts 
and is presently launching a solo practice to provide legal support to local food 
enterprises and sustainable communities. She draws upon her legal training 
and her fifteen years of experience in environmental management and 
sustainable development to assist clients in achieving their goals. 
 1. See generally, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., WHAT WE KNOW: 
THE REALITY, RISKS AND RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2014) [hereinafter 
AAAS] (“Based on well-established evidence, about 97% of climate scientists 
have concluded that human-caused climate change is happening.”); 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_ 
en.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2013]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND 
VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Christopher B. 
Field et al. eds., 2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/ 
IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2014]; NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCI. & THE ROYAL SOC’Y, CLIMATE CHANGE EVIDENCE & CAUSES (2014) 
[hereinafter NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY]; James Hansen et al., Assessing 
“Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to 
Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 
1, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info% 
3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0081648&representation=PDF. 
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time,”2 the global community’s response to date has been largely 
ineffective. For example, levels of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere have continued to rise3 despite an agreement made 
by the majority of the world’s nations in 1992 to stabilize 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases “at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.”4  Scientific evidence strongly suggests that we 
have reached the threshold of dangerous anthropogenic 
interference.5  Accordingly, now is the time for a concerted, 
worldwide effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Within the 
United States, political and private sector responses to climate 
change could be guided by judicial recognition of a fundamental 
right to atmospheric integrity. 
Constitutions ratify societies’ highest values,6 help to engage 
societies in public discourse about important issues,7 supply an 
over-arching normative framework for directing policy,8 provide a 
basis for requesting judicial relief and imposing meaningful 
responsibilities on governments,9 and provide a degree of 
protection from daily politics where long-term goals frequently 
 
 2. Foreword to NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at C2. 
 3. See EPA, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES (2014), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/pdfs/print_ghg-concentrations-2014.pdf. 
 4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 
1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at 
https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/a
pplication/pdf/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a Healthy 
Environment in Us and in Our Posterity, 68 MISS. L.J. 565, 593 (1998); see also, 
John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It 
Protects the Environment: Part I – An Interpretative Framework of Article I, 
Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693, 732 (1999) (“[C]onstitutional provisions 
represent an enduring commitment to the values and principles they contain.”). 
 7. Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less 
Anthropocentric Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615, 
623 (2008) (“A constitutional right to a healthy environment also encourages 
greater civic involvement in environmental concerns and informs the public 
about the importance of environmental protection.”). 
 8. Id. at 624. 
 9. Dernbach, supra note 6, at 723. 
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fall victim to short-term political gains.10  Most significantly, a 
right to atmospheric integrity would serve as a counterweight to 
the presumed right to permanently alter the environment.11  As 
presently construed, constitutionally-protected property rights 
reflect “our old attitude of oblivious destruction, as if the right to 
disrupt were inalienable.”12  However, if property and other 
presently-recognized rights were prudentially balanced against 
an equally fundamental right to atmospheric integrity, society 
would be directed toward a more sustainable path of 
development.13 
Given the opportunity, therefore, the Supreme Court should 
recognize a fundamental right to atmospheric integrity in order to 
protect current and future Americans from the worst effects of 
climate change. A right to atmospheric integrity would also 
establish America’s obligation to reduce greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere to a level that will permit the 
global climate to remain within the range in which modern 
civilization has developed. That is, an obligation for the nation to 
do its part to return the atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) to 350 parts per million (ppm). 
 
 10. Bruckerhoff, supra note 7, at 623. See generally Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 
627 (“[T]he right to a healthy environment . . . will come to exist in light of a 
serious threat that ordinary political life is not capable of adequately 
addressing. If circumstances should come to that, even the ordinarily restrained 
judge should heed the words of Abraham Lincoln: ‘The dogmas of the quiet past 
are inadequate for the stormy present and future. As our circumstances are 
new, we must think anew, and act anew.’”). 
 11. Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 585–86; see Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific 
Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong?, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN 65, 
93 (Joseph F. C. DiMento & Pamela Doughman eds., 1st ed. 2007) (“To deny 
that global warming is real is precisely to deny that humans have become 
geological agents, changing the most basic physical processes of the earth. . . . 
We have changed the chemistry of our atmosphere, causing sea level to rise, ice 
to melt, and climate to change. There is no reason to think otherwise.”). 
 12. Eric T. Freyfogle, Should We Green the Bill?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 159, 170 
(1992). 
 13. See Dernbach, supra note 6, at 718 (“When an environmental provision is 
written into the constitution, all constitutional decision making concerning other 
provisions must be reconciled with the Amendment whenever possible. That 
creates an obligation by the state to ensure that consideration and protection of 
constitutional values concerning the environment are made part of all state 
decision making.). 
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As used in this paper, “atmospheric integrity”14 refers to the 
interrelated physical, chemical, and biological processes on planet 
Earth that enable human and non-human life now and in the 
future and recognizes that modern civilization has developed 
within the relatively stable, current geologic period known as the 
Holocene.15  I chose to focus on atmospheric integrity, rather than 
more broadly on environmental integrity, because the health of 
terrestrial and aquatic habitats is inextricably tied to 
atmospheric stability. This assertion is not meant to minimize the 
multitude of harms impacting land and water. It is just that the 
magnitude of the climate crisis overwhelms all other 
environmental threats and will have obvious, detrimental 
impacts on humanity. Also, the determination of what constitutes 
a decent environment is a value judgment over which reasonable 
people will differ.16  Conversely, focusing on a goal that can be 
measured with scientific accuracy will enable courts and policy 
makers to confidently measure progress toward (or away from) 
the goal. 
In this paper I explore the establishment of a federal 
constitutional right to atmospheric integrity. I begin, in Part II, 
with a review of the threat presented by global climate change. In 
Part III, I discuss various conceptions of rights: constitutional, 
basic, natural, and human. I then review modes of constitutional 
 
 14. Other authors have described a similar concept using terms such as a 
“healthy”, “healthful,” “safe,” or “clean” environment. See, e.g., Noralee Gibson, 
The Right to a Clean Environment, 54 SASK. L. REV. 5, 16 (1990) (“[T]he right to 
a clean environment.” (emphasis added)); Ledewitz, supra note 6; Neil A.F. 
Popovic, Pursuing Environmental Justice with International Human Rights and 
State Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338, 341, 345 (1996). 
 15. Holocene, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia. 
org/entry/Holocene (last visited Jan. 29, 2015) ("Human civilization dates 
entirely to the Holocene."). 
 16. Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?, 23 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 613, 626 (2012); see also, Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246–48 (Mont. 1999) (discussing the debate among 
delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention about whether to 
include descriptive terms of an environmental right in that state’s constitution). 
“The majority felt that the use of the word ‘healthful’ would permit those who 
would pollute our environment to parade in some doctors who could say that if a 
person can walk around with four pounds of arsenic in his lungs or SO2 gas in 
his lungs and wasn't dead, that that would be a healthful environment.”  Id. at 
1246 (citation omitted). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2
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analysis and presently-recognized state and national 
constitutional environmental rights in Part IV. In Part V, I 
review Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania17 
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for the first time, 
provided substantive interpretation of the environmental rights 
contained in the Commonwealth’s constitution. Finally, in Part 
VI, I conclude that the Supreme Court may recognize a 
constitutional right to atmospheric integrity based on historical, 
doctrinal, prudential, ethical, and structural analysis. 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE, A REAL AND IMMINENT 
THREAT 
The Earth receives its energy from the sun in the form of 
solar radiation. Some of this radiation is reflected directly back 
into space, some is absorbed by the Earth’s land and sea surfaces, 
and some is absorbed by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.18  
Greenhouse gases, in turn, emit heat energy in all directions with 
the result that Earth’s surface and lower atmosphere are warm 
compared to space.19  Life as we know it would not be possible 
without this greenhouse effect. There can be, however, too much 
of a good thing. As levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
increase, so too do surface temperatures.20 
Since the time of the industrial revolution, humanity has 
been mining carbon from the ground in the form of coal, oil, and 
natural gas and transferring it to the atmosphere in the form of 
carbon dioxide gas. Direct measurements of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere and air trapped in ice reveal that carbon dioxide 
concentrations are forty percent higher today as compared to 
levels prior to the industrial revolution.21  The current 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and two other 
greenhouse gases—methane and nitrous oxide—are presently at 
levels unprecedented in the last 800,000 years.22  For the period 
 
 17. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
 18. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at B1. Greenhouse gases 
include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and water vapor. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 10. 
 21. Id. at 5. 
 22. IPCC 2013, supra note 1, at 9. 
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starting 800,000 years ago and continuing up until the start of 
the twentieth century, atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide were in the range of 170 to 300 ppm.23  Today, 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased to 
nearly 400 ppm. 24  Research suggests that the last time that 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide approached 400 
ppm was three to five million years ago.25 
Since 1900, the Earth’s average surface temperature has 
warmed by 0.8o C, with much of the increase occurring since the 
mid-1970s.26  For sake of comparison, since the end of the last ice 
age 18,000 years ago, the global temperature increased by four to 
five degrees Celsius over about a 7,000 year period.27  The Earth 
entered the present geologic period, the Holocene, about 10,000 
years ago. Humanity and other species are adapted to the 
Holocene range of conditions.28  The current speed of warming is 
more than ten times faster than any known natural sustained 
change on a global scale.29  More worrisome is the fact that the 
pace of climate change over the next thirty to eighty years is 
projected to continue to be faster and more intense than it 
presently is.30  Even if carbon dioxide emissions were to stop 
today—a wholly unrealistic possibility—excess carbon “will 
remain in and affect the climate system for many millennia.”31  
Additionally, increased global temperatures will persist for many 
 
 23. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 9. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 10. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. Id. at 9. 
 28. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 1, 15. 
 29. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 9; see also Noah S. 
Diffenbaugh and C.B. Field, Changes in Ecologically Critical Terrestrial Climate 
Conditions, 341 SCI. 486, 486 (2013), available at http://www.sciencemag. 
org/content/341/6145/486.full.pdf (“Inertia toward continued emissions creates 
potential 21st-century global warming that is comparable in magnitude to that 
of the largest global changes in the past 65 million years but is orders of 
magnitude more rapid.”). 
 30. COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING AND MONITORING ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
ITS IMPACTS ET AL., ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: ANTICIPATING 
SURPRISES 5 (2013). 
 31. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 6. “A pulse of CO2 injected into the air 
decays by half in about 25 years as CO2 is taken up by the ocean, biosphere and 
soil, but nearly one-fifth is still in the atmosphere after 500 years.”  Id. at 10. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2
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centuries after emissions decline because of the persistence of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and the thermal inertia of the 
ocean.32 
The long-term consequences of global climate change are 
expected to be disruptive to human societies.33  The changing 
climate could affect: 
human welfare, through changes in the supply of food and water; 
human health through wider spread of infectious vector-borne 
diseases, through heat stress and through mental illness; the 
economy, through changes in goods and services; and national 
security as a result of population shifts, heightened competition 
for natural resources, violent conflict and geopolitical 
instability.34 
The “risk of severe economic disruption is rising.”35  
Additional concerns include threats to coastal infrastructure and 
the welfare of the huge population currently living in low-lying 
areas.36  Climate change will undoubtedly lead to human 
migration, displacement, and planned relocation, all of which 
have implications for political stability.37 
 
 32. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 13; see also, NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, 
supra note 1, at 22 (“If emissions of CO2 stopped altogether, it would take many 
thousands of years for atmospheric CO2 to return to ‘pre-industrial’ levels due to 
its very slow transfer to the deep ocean and ultimate burial in ocean sediments. 
Surface temperatures would stay elevated for at least a thousand years, 
implying extremely long-term commitment to a warmer planet due to past and 
current emissions, and sea level would likely continue to rise for many centuries 
even after temperature stopped increasing.”). 
 33. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 19. See generally Seth 
Borenstein, Warming Report Sees Violent, Sicker, Poorer Future, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Nov. 2, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/warming-report-sees-violent-
sicker-poorer-future. 
 34. Camilo Mora et al., The Projected Timing of Climate Departure From 
Recent Variability, 502 NATURE 183, 183 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
 35. Justin Gillis, U.N. Says Lag in Confronting Climate Woes Will be Costly, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/science/earth/un-
says-lag-in-confronting-climate-woes-will-be-costly.html?_r=1. 
 36. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 19. 
 37. José Riera, Senior Adviser to the Director of International Protection, 
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Headquarters, Challenges Relating to Climate 
Change Induced Displacement, Remarks at “Millions of People Without 
Protection: Climate Change Induced Displacement in Developing Countries” 
International Conference (Jan. 29, 20130) (transcript available at 
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The time at which climate in a given location will shift wholly 
outside the range of historic precedent will vary. The global ocean 
pH exceeded historical variability by 200838 due to the fact that 
oceans become more acidic as they absorb carbon dioxide and 
produce carbonic acid.39  Researchers predict that near-surface 
air temperature of the average location on Earth will also move 
beyond historical variability by 2047 (plus or minus 14 years) 
under a business as usual scenario and by 2069 (plus or minus 18 
years) under an emissions stabilization scenario.40  Tropical areas 
will be the first to experience historically unprecedented climates 
because of the relatively small natural climate variability in the 
region.41  By 2050, “most tropical regions will have every 
subsequent month outside of their historical range of 
variability.”42  The roughly one billion people currently living in 
tropical areas will bear the greatest environmental and social 
costs of climate change, yet they are the least responsible for—
 
http://www.unhcr.org/5151bf239.html). “In its 2012 report providing estimates 
of displacement provoked by natural disasters in 2011, the Norwegian Refugee 
Council’s Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported that 
disasters have doubled over the last two decades from about 200 to more than 
400 per year. The report found that in 2011, 14.9 million people were displaced 
within their own borders throughout the world due to natural disasters, mostly 
related to weather events such as floods and storms. Some 89% of the 
displacement occurred in Asia. The report concluded that the impact of climate 
change, such as changing rainfall patterns and increases in temperature, 
combined with rapid population growth, suggest that more and more people are 
likely to be affected by displacement.”  Id. at 3. See also Borenstein, supra note 
33 (“Climate change indirectly increases risks from violent conflict in the form of 
civil war, inter-group violence and violent protests by exacerbating well-
established drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks." 
(quoting a leaked version of an IPCC draft report)). 
 38. Mora et al., supra note 34, at 185. 
 39. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 7 (“Acidification arises as the ocean 
absorbs CO2, producing carbonic acid, thus making the ocean more corrosive to 
the calcium carbonate shells (exoskeletons) of many marine organisms. 
Geochemical records show that ocean pH is already outside its range of the past 
several million years. Warming causes coral bleaching, as overheated coral expel 
symbiotic algae and become vulnerable to disease and mortality. Coral bleaching 
and slowing of coral calcification already are causing mass mortalities, increased 
coral disease, and reduced reef carbonate accretion, thus disrupting coral reef 
ecosystem health.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 40. Mora et al., supra note 34, at 184. 
 41. Id. at 185. 
 42. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2
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and derive the least economic benefit from—the greenhouse gas 
emissions that are driving climate change.43  The imminence of 
climate departure from recent historic variability underscores the 
urgency of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in order to avoid 
widespread disruptions to human societies and global 
biodiversity.44 
There has been some, albeit largely ineffective,45 
international movement toward a coordinated response to climate 
change. One hundred ninety-five nations have agreed under the 
1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases “at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system.”46  The Convention further states that 
“such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure 
that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”47  The 
UNFCCC entered into force on March 21, 1994.48  Fifteen years 
later, the parties to the framework convention, including the 
United States, agreed in the Copenhagen Accord to limit global 
warming to below 2o C relative to pre-industrial times.49  Current 
science, however, indicates that a 2o C increase in global 
temperature would be “disastrous” because: 
[H]umanity and nature, the modern world as we know it, is 
adapted to the Holocene climate that has existed more than 
10,000 years. Warming of 1o C relative to 1880–1920 keeps global 
 
 43. Mora et al., supra note 34, at 186. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 17. 
 46. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2. See also Daniel Bodansky, The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 451, 453–54 (1993). 
 47. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2. 
 48. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/ 
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
 49. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 2; see also, Bill McKibbon, Global 
Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE, July 19, 2012, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-
20120719?page=5 (describing that the Copenhagen Accord is a purely voluntary 
agreement with no enforcement mechanism). 
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temperature close to the Holocene range, but warming of 2o C, to 
at least the Eemian level, could cause major dislocations for 
civilization.50 
While the situation is dire, there is still hope. Specifically, a 
return to approximately 350 ppm of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere would restore the Earth’s energy balance.51  This 
goal can be achieved this century by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions six percent per year while also simultaneously effecting 
100 GtC of carbon storage in the biosphere and soils (e.g., through 
reforestation and improved agricultural practices).52  If we delay 
emission reductions until 2020, a reduction rate of fifteen percent 
per year will be required to achieve 350 ppm in 2100.53  Delay not 
only increases the magnitude of the necessary annual emission 
reductions, it also further imperils youth and future generations. 
Because the physical climate system has great inertia, there is 
already additional climate change “in the pipeline.”54  
Temperatures will continue to increase due to the carbon that has 
already been emitted. Ongoing emissions will increase the total 
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and further increase 
Earth’s energy imbalance and associated repercussions. As a 
consequence, youth and future generations are likely to inherit “a 
situation in which grave consequences are assured, practically 
out of their control, but not of their doing.”55 
 
 50. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 15. See also, A.J. Challinor et al., A Meta-
analysis of Crop Yield Under Climate Change and Adaptation, 4 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 287 (2014), available at http://www.nature.com/nclimate/ 
journal/v4/n4/full/nclimate2153.html (“Without adaptation, losses in aggregate 
production are expected for wheat, rice and maize in both temperate and 
tropical regions by 2 °C of local warming.”). 
 51. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
 52. Id. at 18. 
 53. Id. at 10. 
 54. Id. at 19. 
 55. Id. at 19–20. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2
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III. WHAT ARE RIGHTS? 
Rights protect people from threats to their physical well-
being, political equality, or sense of dignity.56  Where rights exist, 
there is a correlated duty levied upon others to act to alleviate the 
harm or to refrain from the harmful action itself.57  Rights may 
be categorized as “constitutional,” “basic,” “natural,” and/or 
“human.”  Constitutional rights are those textual and non-textual 
rights protected by a state or national constitution. Basic rights 
are those that are “essential to normal life” and which are a 
prerequisite to the practice of all other rights.58  For example, air 
to breathe, water to drink, and food to eat are basic necessities of 
life. The concept of basic rights is conceptually similar to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century concept of moral or “natural” 
rights.59  According to Locke, Paine, Jefferson and others, natural 
rights, unlike legal or contractual rights, are universal and exist 
independently of government.60 
The concept of human rights was first codified following the 
atrocities of World War II in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR).61  Human rights, like natural rights, exist 
independently of states; people have human rights because they 
are people, not because they live in a particular place.62  Human 
rights, though, differ from natural rights in that the modifier 
“human” calls attention to the social context of the rights. 63  
Human rights presume the existence of governments and define 
relationships between governments and citizens.64  As such, 
human rights are “fundamental international moral and legal 
 
 56. RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 36 (2009). 
 57. Id. at 41, 42, 46; see also, Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 165 (“A right cannot 
exist . . . without a corresponding duty to protect it.”). 
 58. HISKES, supra note 56, at 39 (quoting HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: 
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 29–30, (2d ed. 1980)). 
 59. HISKES, supra note 56, at 26. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Popovic, supra note 14, at 352. 
 63. See HISKES, supra note 56, at 30. 
 64. Id. 
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norms which protect people . . . from severe but common social, 
political, and legal abuses.”65 
In recent years there has been a convergence of 
environmental rights with human rights.66  There is presently no 
agreement on whether a human right to environmental integrity 
exists.67  However, among scholars, “the idea of strong or even 
absolute—i.e. not subject to balancing—environmental 
fundamental rights seems to be gaining support.”68  One such 
proponent is Professor Richard P. Hiskes who makes a compelling 
argument that environmental rights are “emergent” human 
rights defined, in part, by a society’s obligations to future 
generations of its own community.69 
According to Hiskes, where an emergent risk threatens basic 
human needs, then protection from that harm takes the form of 
“emergent rights.”70  That is, to the extent that human 
interactions with the environment are harmful to both humans 
and the natural environment, these detrimental effects ought to 
generate human rights for protection from the detrimental 
effects.71  Environmental rights “emerge” as rights when social 
impacts to the natural world reach a critical juncture.72  Given 
the robust scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate change, we 
must, according to Hiskes’ reasoning, acknowledge the necessity 
of a right to atmospheric integrity. Professor Hiskes concludes 
that, “environmental rights do exist and are unique for their 
expressly emergent character . . . . In their emergent nature and 
their unique relationship to time, environmental rights invoke 
 
 65. James Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical 
Perspectives on Its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 288 (1993). 
 66. See, e.g., Popovic, supra note 14, at 340. 
 67. See generally Boyle, supra note 16; Bruckerhoff, supra note 7; Gibson, 
supra note 14; Nickel, supra note 65. 
 68. Felix Ekardt, Climate Change and Justice: Perspectives of Legal Theory, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 63, 66 (Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds., 2013). 
 69. See generally HISKES, supra note 56. 
 70. Id. at 29–30. 
 71. Id. at 30. 
 72. Id. at 40. For example, “when degradation of soil, water, and air supplies 
become impossible to ignore, when human knowledge about how life impacts 
environment and vice versa becomes widespread—with the emergence of these 
factors in human history comes the understanding of the necessity of 
environmental rights.”  Id. 
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the possibility of intergenerational justice at least as it pertains 
to environmental protection and sustainability.”73 The 
intergenerational aspect of Hiskes’ conception of environmental 
rights is grounded in a community’s presumption of its own cross-
generation existence.74  That is, cultural continuity, including the 
passage of political institutions to future generations, gives rise to 
an obligation to respect the environmental human rights of future 
generations.75 
Hiskes’ conclusions evoke the theory of intergenerational 
equity, which states that: 
We, the human species, hold the natural environment of our 
planet in common with other species, other people, and with past, 
present and future generations. As members of the present 
generation, we are both trustees, responsible for the robustness 
and integrity of our planet, and beneficiaries, with the right to 
use and benefit from it for ourselves.76 
The right to use and benefit from the natural environment is 
a generational right held by generations in relation to each 
other.77  The right provides a moral basis for protecting the 
interests of all generations in a healthy and robust planet.78  
Intergenerational equity is defined by three normative principles: 
1) each generation must conserve options such that it does not 
unduly restrict options available to future generations;79 2) each 
generation should maintain the quality of the planet so that it is 
passed on in no worse condition than that it which it was 
received;80 and 3) each generation should provide its members 
with equitable rights of access to the legacy of past generations 
 
 73. HISKES, supra note 56, at 46. 
 74. Id. at 66. 
 75. Id. at 67. 
 76. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable 
Development, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19, 20 (1992) [hereinafter “Weiss, In 
Fairness”]. 
 77. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: A Legal 
Framework for Global Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 385 (Edith Brown Weiss 
ed., 1992) [hereinafter “Weiss, Intergenerational Equity”]. 
 78. See generally Weiss, Intergenerational Equity. 
 79. See infra notes 249–54 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra notes 257–58 and accompanying text. 
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and conserve access for future generations.81  The concept of 
intergenerational equity has “gained significant traction both 
rhetorically and as a legally cognizable principle in domestic and 
international forums.”82 
The pronounced international commitment to protecting the 
environmental rights of future generations83 can be found in the 
1972 Stockholm Convention: “Man has the fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-
being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and 
improve the environment for present and future generations.”84  
Explicit protections of natural resources for future generations 
are incorporated in many international agreements, including the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.85  The 1992 
Rio Declaration proclaims that humans “are entitled to a healthy 
and productive life in harmony with nature” and that the “right to 
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations.”86  Over the past twenty years, sustainability—
which is intended to extend justice across an intergenerational 
and global dimension—has become a key policy objective of the 
United Nations, the European Union, and many national 
governments.87 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 
The constitutions of many states and nations contain 
environmental rights. Up to thirty-one U.S. states and Puerto 
 
 81. Weiss, In Fairness, supra note 76, at 22–23. 
 82. Brett M. Frischmann, Some Thoughts on Shortsightedness and 
Intergenerational Equity, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 462 (2005). 
 83. Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 663. 
 84. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
Swed., June 5–16, 1972, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973). 
 85. See generally Weiss, Intergenerational Equity, supra note 77. 
 86. United Nations Conference on Environmental Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, princs. 1, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I 
(Aug. 12, 1992). 
 87. Ekardt, supra note 68, at 65. 
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Rico reference the environment or natural resources in their 
constitutions.88  Similarly, five dozen countries worldwide have 
constitutional provisions purporting to guarantee a fundamental 
right to a healthy, adequate, or quality environment.89  An 
additional seventy national constitutions contain environmental 
policy directives and/or procedural rights,90 which while not 
directly enforceable, can influence legislative policy and judicial 
interpretation.91 
The descriptions of these constitutional environmental rights 
are as varied as they are numerous. For instance, the people of 
Massachusetts “shall have the right to clean air and water, 
freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, 
scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment.”92  In 
Michigan, the “conservation and development of the natural 
resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount 
public concern in the interest of the health, safety and general 
welfare of the people.”93  In Texas, the “preservation and 
conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each 
and all hereby declared public rights and duties.”94 
In both the sub-national and international context, 
environmental provisions of constitutions have rarely been 
 
 88. Popovic, supra note 14, at 355. See also, James May & William 
Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 306 (James R. May ed., 2011) 
(finding that twenty-two states address environmental and natural resources 
issues); Janelle P. Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment: 
Enforcing Environmental Protection through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 
INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 185 (2001) (finding twenty-one such provisions). The 
different figures result from differing definitions of what constitutes 
environmental provisions. 
 89. James R. May & Erin Daly, Constitutional Environmental Rights 
Worldwide, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 329, 330 
(James R. May ed., 2011). 
 90. James R. May, Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights 
Worldwide, 23 PACE  ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 114 (2006). 
 91. See, e.g., May & Daly, supra note 89, at 331 (describing a Greek case in 
which a river was saved from being dammed by judicial interpretation of a 
policy directive). 
 92. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII. 
 93. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52. 
 94. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a). 
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subjected to substantive interpretation. 95  This judicial reticence 
is due, among other reasons, to concerns about recognizing and 
enforcing emerging constitutional features and restraining 
economic development and property rights.96  Furthermore, there 
are questions of scope. What exactly does “environment” refer to?  
Courts are often reluctant to enforce claims to a right with large 
and amorphous boundaries.97  Similarly, what degree and 
specificity of harm is necessary to satisfy requirements for 
standing?98  What degree of environmental degradation is 
permissible before a constitutional violation has been effected 
and, if a violation is found, what enforcement authority does a 
court have to impose a remedy? 99  The difficulty of the challenge 
of interpreting and upholding constitutional environmental rights 
should not negate the rights, however. Just as “our difficulties in 
drawing the parameters of the right to free speech leave 
unchallenged our belief in its necessity,”100 so too should 
environmental rights be vindicated. Toward this end, 
adjudication of explicit constitutional environmental rights 
continues to evolve around the world and scholars have identified 
a “positive and powerful” trend in which “momentum is only 
likely to increase as courts become more comfortable with 
environmental rights protection and as environmental pressures 
grow.”101 
The answers to at least some of the questions presented 
above may be elucidated through the traditional modes of 
constitutional analysis described by Professor Philip Bobbitt in 
his book, Constitutional Fate. 102  Bobbitt described six types of 
analysis that the Supreme Court has used, individually and in 
combination, in interpreting the Constitution: textual, historical, 
doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical.103  I will briefly 
 
 95. May & Romanowicz, supra note 88, at 307. 
 96. Id. 
 97. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 338. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. HISKES, supra note 56, at 40. 
 101. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 331. 
 102. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, Book I: Constitutional Argument, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1982). 
 103. Id. 
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introduce each concept here and provide a synopsis of the 
application of these modes to substantive due process analysis of 
non-textual rights. Where applicable, I will also provide examples 
of how the various modes of analysis have been applied to 
interpret environmental rights under state and national 
constitutions. 
Textual arguments are those drawn from a present 
understanding – the “fair meaning” – of the words of the 
constitution without reference to extrinsic evidence.104  Thus, a 
disregard of precedent is permissible because a contemporary 
reading of a particular passage may differ from an earlier 
understanding of the same text.105  A constraint of the textual 
approach, of course, is that “in a Constitution of limited powers 
what is not expressed must also be interpreted.”106  In Pedro 
Flores v. Corporaciόn del Cobre, Codelco, Chile’s Supreme Court 
vindicated a textual constitutional right “to live in an 
environment free from contamination” by enjoining the dumping 
of copper mill tailings onto Chilean beaches.107 
Historical arguments are based on a construction of the 
original understanding of a particular constitutional provision by, 
for example, referring to statements made by members of a 
constitutional convention.108  Proponents of this approach are 
seeking “the authoritative reading in a particular context.”109  A 
primary shortcoming of this approach in the federal context is the 
scarcity of records documenting the full discussion of any given 
aspect of the original Constitutional Convention.110  Where 
records do exist, they reveal that delegates often approved of 
particular language for disparate reasons.111  The Supreme Court 
of Illinois relied upon historical analysis when it was called upon 
to construe the contours of the constitutional “right to a healthful 
 
 104. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 7, 25, 34. “[T]he interpretation of the text is 
the one given by the man in the street.”  Id.at 32. 
 105. Id. at 33. 
 106. Id. at 38. 
 107. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 333 (citing CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA 
REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19(8)). 
 108. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 9, 10. 
 109. Id. at 13. 
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. Id. at 12. 
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environment.”112  Because the meaning of “healthful 
environment” was not clear from the constitutional text, the court 
looked to the drafting history of the article to conclude that 
“‘healthful environment’ was intended to refer to the relationship 
between the environment and human health. . . . The right to a 
‘healthful environment’ was therefore not intended to include the 
protection of endangered and threatened species.”113  Illinois is 
representative of the national trend among courts that have 
considered the subject and have found that modifiers like 
“quality,” “clean,” or “adequate,” protect human uses of natural 
resources rather than nature itself.114 
Doctrinal arguments are those that assert principles derived 
from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on 
precedent (e.g., by reference to Restatements).115  The doctrinal 
ideology is a principled approach based on premises of general 
applicability “which holds that fairness will result . . . if methods 
of judging which all concede are fair are followed 
scrupulously.”116  Doctrinal arguments focus more on the 
principle involved in a dispute, rather than upon the particular 
facts of a case.117  Conceptually, doctrinal arguments would also 
seem to incorporate consideration of international norms where 
there is an absence of national precedent. 
In contrast to doctrinal analysis, prudential arguments tend 
to be fact-dependent.118  Prudential arguments come into play 
when courts are asked to give effect to competing constitutional 
 
 112. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999); see also ILL. 
CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is 
to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and 
future generations. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the 
implementation and enforcement of this public policy.”); id. § 2 (“Each person 
has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right 
against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal 
proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General 
Assembly may provide by law.”) 
 113. Glisson, 720 N.E.2d at 1042. 
 114. May & Romanowicz, supra note 88, at 313. 
 115. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 7, 45–52. 
 116. Id. at  43, 57. 
 117. Id. at 66, 70. 
 118. Id. 
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provisions.119  Thus, the determination of which text should be 
given greater weight is a matter of prudence, which takes 
political and economic circumstances into account.120  The 
Supreme Court of the Philippines undertook a form of prudential 
analysis in a case where it was asked to give meaning to the 
nation’s constitutional right to life in combination with a 
constitutional policy directive that “[t]he State shall protect and 
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful 
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”121  
The court found for the plaintiffs (minor children who sought to 
cancel existing timber licenses and stop the issuance of new 
ones)122 and determined that the right to a healthful ecology, 
coupled with the Philippine constitution’s right to life provision, 
imposed “a solemn obligation” on the State to protect both 
interests because a failure to do so would condemn future 
generations “to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of 
sustaining life.”123 
Structural arguments are based on the relative powers of 
governments (i.e., among different branches of government and 
between federal and state governments) as defined by the 
Constitution as a whole.124  The relevant text does not refer to 
express grants of power or particular prohibitions, but rather to 
those passages that, “by setting up structures of a certain kind, 
permit us to draw the requirements of the relationship among 
structures.”125 
Finally, Bobbitt includes ethical arguments, which he 
describes as “perhaps controversial” and also as often being “the 
animating argumentative factor in constitutional decision-
 
 119. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 61. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See May & Daly, supra note 89, at 334 (quoting CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 
15–16 (Phil.)). 
 122. Minors Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July 
30, 1993) (Phil.). 
 123. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 334 (quoting Minors Oposa v. Factoran Jr., 
G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.) (Feliciano, J, 
concurring)). 
 124. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 74. 
 125. Id. at 80. 
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making.”126  Ethical arguments are not moral arguments in the 
sense that certain actions are either right or wrong.127  Rather, 
they reflect the character or ethos of the American polity and 
compel solutions that comport with “the sort of people we are and 
the means we have chosen to solve political and customary 
constitutional problems.”128  Ethical arguments may be found in 
such notable cases as Moore v. City of East Cleveland,129 Meyer v. 
Nebraska,130 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.131  For example, in 
Moore, the Court found that a zoning ordinance that made it 
illegal for a grandmother to live with her son and two grandsons 
(only one of which was the son’s son) was unconstitutional.132  In 
his opinion announcing the judgment of the court, Justice Powell 
“placed the decision on an ethical ground.”133  Ethical arguments 
give “the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process a 
scope far exceeding the procedural, common, and historical 
understanding of the term.”134  They are “almost” substantive due 
process by another name because, “as applied to the analysis of 
state actions, ethical constitutional arguments usually appear in 
the form of substantive due process because the due process 
clause is the textual vehicle by which the ethos of limited 
government is applied to the states.”135 
 
 126. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 93. 
 127. Id. at 94. 
 128. Id. at 94–95. 
 129. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 130. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 131. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 132. Moore, 434 U.S. at 496. 
 133. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 96; see Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05 (Justice 
Powell noted that, “T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family 
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition. . . . Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for 
the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, 
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with 
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of 
constitutional recognition. Over the years millions of our citizens have grown up 
in just such an environment, and most, surely, have profited from it. Even if 
conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in extended family 
households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained 
over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger 
conception of the family.”). 
 134. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 99. 
 135. Id. at 100. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2
2_VALENTINE FINAL 8/24/2015  12:04 PM 
76 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 
 
Substantive due process analysis refers to the application of 
these six traditional modes of analysis to interpretation of the 
word “liberty” in the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to identify non-textual fundamental 
rights. 136  The existence of unenumerated rights is supported by 
the Ninth Amendment, which states, “[t]he enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”137  Rather, the 
enumerated rights “act to give us a constitutional motif, a 
cadence of our rights, so that once heard we can supply the rest 
on our own.”138 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law.139  Liberty interests include “the rights to marry; 
to have children; to direct the education and upbringing of one’s 
children; to marital privacy; to use contraception; to bodily 
integrity; and to abortion.”140  The Court is reluctant, though, to 
recognize new liberty interests under the doctrine of substantive 
due process.141  Accordingly, the Court purports to undertake a 
rigorous, two-step analysis. The Court first considers whether 
asserted fundamental rights and liberties are “objectively, deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if they were sacrificed.”142  Second, the Court requires 
that asserted fundamental liberty interests be carefully 
formulated and defined with precise language.143 
In the international context, some nations have inferred 
environmental rights from other constitutionally entrenched 
 
 136. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944–45 (3rd ed. 2009). 
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; See also, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
484 (1965). 
 138. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 177. 
 139. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 140. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720 (1997) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 141. Id. at 720. 
 142. Id. at 720–21 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 143. Id. at 721–23. 
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rights. 144  As with rights elucidated through substantive due 
process analysis, derivative environmental rights are those that 
are not expressed in the text of a constitution, but are found to 
reside in another independent constitutional right, such as the 
right to life.145  For example, the Supreme Court of India found 
that the right to life encompasses a right to a quality 
environment.146 
In many instances, courts will enlist numerous modes of 
constitutional analysis in a single case. For example, in a 
dispute147 pitting mining interests against constitutional 
provisions stating that residents of Montana have a “right to a 
clean and healthful environment”148 and that “[t]he state and 
each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful 
environment in Montana for present and future generations,”149 
the Montana Supreme Court considered the state constitution’s 
text and structure along with relevant doctrine and history. 
Based on its analysis, the court concluded that 
[T]he right to a clean and healthful environment is a 
fundamental right because it is guaranteed by the Declaration of 
Rights found at Article II, Section 3 of Montana’s Constitution, 
and that any statute or rule which implicates that right must be 
strictly scrutinized and can only survive scrutiny if the State 
establishes a compelling state interest and that its action is 
closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least onerous 
path that can be taken to achieve the State’s objective.150 
Montana is, thus, notable for being the first U.S. state to 
recognize a fundamental right to a clean and healthful 
 
 144. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 332, 335 (describing that derivative 
environmental rights are found in nations including India, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and Pakistan). 
 145. Id. at 335. 
 146. Id. (The Supreme Court of India explicitly stated that the “[r]ight to life is 
a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the 
right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life.” 
(citing Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420 (India)). 
 147. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 
1999). 
 148. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 149. Id. art. IX, § 1. 
 150. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1246. 
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environment. 151  In December 2013, Pennsylvania became the 
second state to recognize a similar fundamental right to a quality 
environment.152 
V. EXPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN ROBINSON 
TOWNSHIP V. COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
A. Overview of the Case 
In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,153 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in a plurality decision that 
public natural resources are protected by the Pennsylvania 
Constitution as public trust assets, which the state has a 
fiduciary obligation to maintain,154 and also that individuals 
cannot be deprived of their substantive due process rights with 
regard to their private enjoyment of property in violation of the 
Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions.155  The case concerned a 
statute, Act 13 of 2012, that was intended to, among others 
things, permit optimal development of the Commonwealth’s oil 
and gas resources.156  Enactment of Act 13 was prompted by 
increases in natural gas drilling operations in the Marcellus 
Shale Formation in Northeastern Pennsylvania.157  Prior to 2003, 
 
 151. Montana has subsequently been reluctant to entertain environmental 
rights cases. See, e.g., Lohmeier v. Gallatin Cnty., 135 P.3d 775, 778 (Mont. 
2006) (holding that plaintiffs did not establish a violation of their right to a 
clean and healthful environment sufficient to give them standing). 
 152. See generally Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
 153. Id. at 956–57. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. at 1008. 
 156. Id. at 969. Other objectives included protecting the property rights of 
people residing in areas hosting oil and gas operations; and protecting natural 
resources, environmental rights, and values secured by the Constitution of 
Pennsylvania. 
 157. Id. at 915. The Marcellus Shale Sedimentary Bedrock Formation 
straddles portions of Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, West Virginia, Virginia, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Southern Ontario, Canada 
(beneath Lake Erie). Marcellus Shale – Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, 
GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2014). 
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it was not technologically feasible to sustain industrial-scale 
production of natural gas from the formation because of the 
limited size and scattered nature of the gas pockets.158  With the 
advent of hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” and horizontal 
drilling, however, it is now possible to recover natural gas from 
unconventional sources on an industrial scale.159 
Act 13 revised and re-codified Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas 
Act.160  Two chapters, Chapter 32, which concerns well 
permitting, and Chapter 33, which prohibits local regulation of oil 
and gas operations, were at issue in the case. Per Chapter 32, the 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) “shall waive” 
requirements for setbacks from sensitive water resources 
provided that oil and gas operators submit water protection 
plans.161  Industry was further accommodated by Section 3215(d), 
which prohibited municipalities from appealing DEP’s decisions 
regarding well permits.162 
Chapter 33, Local Ordinances Relating to Oil and Gas 
Operations, accomplished an unprecedented “displacement of 
 
 158. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 914. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 915.  
“The new chapters of the Oil and Gas Act are: 
Chapter 23, which establishes a fee schedule for the unconventional 
gas well industry, and provides for the collection and distribution of 
these fees; 
Chapter 25, which provides for appropriation and allocation of funds 
from the Oil and Gas Lease Fund; 
Chapter 27, which creates a natural gas energy development 
program to fund public or private projects for converting vehicles to 
utilize natural gas fuel; 
Chapter 32, which describes the well permitting process and defines 
statewide limitations on oil and gas development; 
Chapter 33, which prohibits any local regulation of oil and gas 
operations, including via environmental legislation, and requires 
statewide uniformity among local zoning ordinances with respect to 
the development of oil and gas resources; and 
Chapter 35, which provides that producers, rather than landowners, 
are responsible for payment of the unconventional gas well fees 
authorized under Chapter 23.” Id. 
 161. Id. at 939 (citing 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4) (2012)). 
 162. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(d) (“Notwithstanding any other law, no 
municipality or storage operator shall have a right of appeal or other form of 
review from the [Department of Environmental Protection]’s decision.”). 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2
2_VALENTINE FINAL 8/24/2015  12:04 PM 
80 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 
 
prior planning, and derivative expectations, regarding land use, 
zoning, and enjoyment of property.”163  Section 3304 established 
requirements for uniform local ordinances that “shall allow for 
the reasonable development of oil and gas resources.”164  
Accordingly, all political subdivisions were required to, among 
other things, authorize oil and gas operations as a permitted use 
in all zoning districts and were prohibited from imposing any 
restrictions on structural height, lighting or noise more stringent 
than those presently permitted for industrial uses within the 
zoning district. 165  Municipalities were also prohibited from 
imposing any “limits or conditions on subterranean operations or 
hours of operation of compressor stations and processing plants or 
hours of operation for the drilling of oil and gas wells or the 
assembly and disassembly of drilling rigs.”166 
Act 13 was signed into law on February 14, 2012. In 
response, a group of “citizens” filed a petition for review in the 
Commonwealth Court seeking a declaration that Act 13 was 
unconstitutional and a permanent injunction prohibiting 
application of Act 13.167  An en banc panel of the Commonwealth 
Court held Act 13 unconstitutional in part and enjoined 
 
 163. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 972. 
 164. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304(a). 
 165. Id. § 3304(b)(3), (5). 
 166. Id. § 3304(b)(10); see also Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 972. The remaining 
provisions of Chapter 33 establish enforcement mechanisms. For instance, 
Section 3306 authorizes civil actions against municipalities to enjoin 
enforcement of local ordinances deemed to be contrary to the provisions of Act 13 
or the Commonwealth’s Municipalities Planning Code. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
3306. Sections 3307 and 3308 impose significant financial consequences—in the 
form of shifting attorneys’ fees and the withholding of unconventional gas well 
fees—on local governments that fail to accommodate Act 13. Id. §§ 3307, 3308. 
 167. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913–14 (The challengers, or “citizens,” are 
several Pennsylvania municipalities, two residents and local officials, the 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and a physician.). 
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application of the implicated sections.168  Both parties169 cross-
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.170 
B. Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court 
(OAJC) 
The justices writing the OAJC utilized five171 of Bobbitt’s six 
analytical arguments to explicate the citizens’ and state’s rights 
and obligations under the Environmental Rights Amendment of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution, and also to assess the provisions 
of Act 13 against those rights. The Environmental Rights 
Amendment, Article 1, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, states that: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of 
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.172 
Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is the 
Commonwealth’s Declaration of Rights, which reserves “certain 
inherent and indefeasible rights” to the people.173  Such 
fundamental rights “are inherent in man’s nature and preserved 
rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution.”174  
Accordingly, Article 1 rights impose structural limitations on the 
power of state government. For example, the General Assembly’s 
broad and flexible police power authorizes it to enact laws 
 
 168. Id. at 914 (referencing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 
494 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)). 
 169. The Commonwealth was represented by the Office of the Attorney 
General, the Public Utilities Commission, and the Department of 
Environmental Protection. Id. at 913–14. 
 170. Id. In addition to the constitutionality of Act 13, the parties raised claims 
concerning standing, ripeness, political question, special laws, and the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
 171. The justices applied structural, textural, historical, doctrinal, and 
prudential arguments. See generally Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d 901. 
 172. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27. 
 173. Id. art. 1, § 1. 
 174. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948. 
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promoting public health, safety, and welfare, but such laws may 
not unreasonably infringe upon fundamental rights reserved to 
the people.175  It is the duty of courts “to see to it that no right 
secured by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed 
by legislation.”176 
The OAJC began its analysis of how Article 1, Section 27 
restrains the exercise of police power by the government by 
undertaking a phrase-by phrase assessment of the text of the 
constitutional provision as the actual language is popularly 
understood.177  In assessing the first clause—”[t]he people have a 
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment”—
the court observed that the clause affirms a limitation on the 
state’s power to act contrary to this right.178  Moreover, the use of 
the word preservation “implicates a holistic analytical approach to 
ensure both the protection from harm or damage and to ensure 
the maintenance and perpetuation of an environment of quality 
for the benefit of future generations.”179  The reservation of this 
right in the people places an obligation on state and local 
government to refrain from “unduly infringing upon the right” 
and upon the judiciary to vindicate Section 27 rights.180  The 
court recognized that “clean air” and “pure water” are relative 
attributes and, therefore, deference is due to agency expertise in 
making determinations about whether standards have been 
met.181  Nonetheless, the court set a benchmark for judicial 
decisions based on the express purpose of Article 27 that 
decisions must provide a “bulwark against actual or likely 
degradation of, inter alia, our air and water quality.”182  
Consequently, economic development may not proceed at the 
“expense of an unreasonable degradation of the environment.”183  
 
 175. Id. at 947. 
 176. Id. at 929 (quoting Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527–28 (1898)). 
 177. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 943. 
 178. Id. at 948. 
 179. Id. at 951. 
 180. Id. at 952. 
 181. Id. at 953. 
 182. Id (quoting Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 
1236, 1249 (Mont. 1999)). 
 183. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 954. 
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Rather, the state must exercise its police power “in a manner that 
promotes sustainable property use and economic development.”184 
The second sentence of Article 27—”Pennsylvania’s public 
natural resources are the common property of all the people, 
including generations yet to come”—reserves common ownership 
of public natural resources in the people, including those living 
and those yet to be born.185  Such resources represent the “full 
array of resources implicating the public interest,” including 
state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral rights, along with 
ambient air, surface and ground water, and wild flora and 
fauna.186 
The final clause—”[a]s trustee of these resources, the 
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit 
of all the people”—imposes both negative and affirmative duties 
on the Commonwealth.187  The provision establishes that the 
Commonwealth, under the public trust doctrine, must manage 
the corpus of the trust (public natural resources) for the named 
beneficiaries (the people).188  Because the Commonwealth, rather 
than the General Assembly, is named as the trustee of public 
natural resources, “all existing branches and levels of government 
derive constitutional duties and obligations with respect to the 
people.”189  The Commonwealth must refrain from acts that 
permit or encourage the degradation of public natural 
resources.190  The Commonwealth must also act affirmatively to 
protect the environment via legislative action.191  In fulfilling 
these two obligations, the Commonwealth must be cognizant of 
how decisions will impact all beneficiaries, including generations 
yet to come.192  The court further noted that these duties “are 
tempered by legitimate development tending to improve upon the 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955. 
 187. Id. at 949, 955. 
 188. Id. at 956. 
 189. Id. at 977. 
 190. Id. at 957. 
 191. Id. at 958. 
 192. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 959. 
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lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with the evident goal of promoting 
sustainable development.”193 
The court’s textual interpretation of Article 27 is supported 
by the amendment’s legislative history. When it was proposed in 
the 1969–1970 and 1971–1972 legislative sessions, the 
Environmental Rights Amendment received the unanimous 
assent of both chambers.194  The Environmental Rights 
Amendment grew out of recognition that through centuries of 
virtually unrestrained exploitation195 of lumber, game, and coal, 
Pennsylvanians had “uglified our land and . . . called it 
progress.”196  Aware of this history and the associated financial, 
health, and quality of life costs,197 the drafters of the amendment 
sought to create a “legally enforceable right to protect and 
enhance environmental quality”198 by giving the natural 
environment “the same Constitutional protection we give to our 
political environment.”199  On May 18, 1971, the voters of 
Pennsylvania ratified the proposed amendment by a margin of 
nearly four to one.200  The Robinson court concluded that, 
through their ratification, the citizens had delegated public trust 
duties “concomitantly to all branches and levels of government in 
recognition that the quality of the environment is a task with 
both local and statewide implications, and to ensure that all 
government neither infringed upon the people’s rights nor failed 
to act for the benefit of the people.”201  Additionally, the court 
observed that “Pennsylvania’s past is the necessary prologue 
 
 193. Id. at 958. 
 194. Id. at 961. 
 195. Id. at 963. 
 196. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 961. Pennsylvania’s history of environmental 
tragedies include the 1948 Donora smog incident in which corrosive industrial 
smoke caused twenty deaths by asphyxiation and sent 7,000 people to the 
hospital; the 1959 Knox Mine disaster in which the Susquehanna River 
disappeared into a coal vein; the discharge of mine water in 1961 from a Glen 
Alden mine that killed more than 300,000 fish; and the Centralia mine fire that 
started in 1962 and is still burning (and which led to the relocation of all 
residents in 1984). 
 197. Id. at 963. 
 198. Id. at 952. 
 199. Id. at 954 
 200. Id. at 962. 
 201. Id. at 963. 
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here: the reserved rights, and the concomitant duties and 
constraints, embraced by the Environmental Rights Amendment, 
are a product of our unique history.”202 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that nothing in its 
precedent offered substantive and controlling guidance with 
respect to the type of claims asserted by the citizens in this 
case.203  The precedent that did exist weakened the import of the 
plain language of the constitution such that the viability of 
constitutional environmental claims was limited by whether the 
General Assembly had acted and by that body’s policy choices. 204  
The court rejected this precedent because it described the 
Commonwealth’s obligations in much narrower terms than what 
was in the text of Article 27. It assumed that judicial relief is 
contingent upon and constrained by legislative action, and, most 
significantly, it had “the effect of minimizing the constitutional 
duties of executive agencies and the judicial branch, and 
circumscribing the abilities of these entities to carry out their 
constitutional duties independent of legislative control.”205  The 
court asserted that such precedent did not diminish the textual, 
organic rights contained in the Environmental Rights 
Amendment nor did it preclude the court from recognizing and 
enforcing the plain and original understanding of those rights.206  
Thus, the court rejected doctrinal arguments based on its 
“obligation to vindicate the rights of its citizens where the 
circumstances require it and in accordance with the plain 
language of the Constitution.”207 
 
 202. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 976. 
 203. Id. at 969. 
 204. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950, 955; see also Dernbach, supra note 6, at 
696 (“In the first decision, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield 
Tower, the courts held that the Amendment created a self-executing public 
right, but that construction of an observation tower overlooking the Gettysburg 
Civil War battlefield would not violate that right. Shortly thereafter, in Payne v. 
Kassab, the commonwealth court developed a three-part test for applying the 
Amendment that utterly ignores the constitutional text, but which has been 
widely used ever since. The test is so weak that litigants using it to challenge 
environmentally damaging projects are almost always unsuccessful.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 205. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967. 
 206. Id. at 969. 
 207. Id. 
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Based on the structural, textual, historical, and doctrinal 
arguments described above, the court concluded that 
Pennsylvania’s “organic charter . . . now explicitly guarantees the 
people’s right to an environment of quality and the concomitant 
expressed reservation of a right to benefit from the 
Commonwealth’s duty of management of our public natural 
resources.”208 
In applying the newly explicated rights and obligations to Act 
13, the court also considered prudential arguments. The court 
was concerned that Act 13 upset the reasonable expectations of 
property owners, particularly those who purchased homes in 
residential areas with an expectation that the surrounding 
environment would continue to be conducive to family life.209  
Because Chapter 33 of Act 13 “fundamentally disrupted those 
expectations,” the court held that the General Assembly 
transgressed its delegated police powers.210  It further held 
particular portions of the Act unconstitutional because the 
provisions failed to satisfy the constitutional requirements that 
the General Assembly protect the corpus of the trust and treat all 
beneficiaries equally211 or because the provisions failed to “ensure 
compliance with the express command of the Environmental 
Rights Amendment that the Commonwealth trustee ‘conserve 
and maintain,’ inter alia, the waters of the Commonwealth.”212 
C. Concurring Opinion 
Justice Max Baer concurred in finding that portions of Act 13 
were unconstitutional. He rested his decision, though, on a 
finding that these sections violated substantive due process as 
defined by precedent (i.e., doctrinal analysis).213  Justice Baer 
used substantive due process to vindicate the existing right of 
 
 208. Id. at 976. 
 209. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 980. 
 212. Id. at 984. 
 213. See id. at 1008 (“[B]ecause these statutes force municipalities to enact 
zoning ordinances, which violate the substantive due process rights of their 
citizenries, they cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.”). 
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quiet enjoyment of private property.214  Application of 
substantive due process in this fashion protects individuals 
against “the exercise of power without any reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental 
objective.”215  That is, the substantive due process guarantee 
protects individuals against the arbitrary and oppressive exercise 
of government power, regardless of the fairness of procedures 
used to implement the government policy.216  Thus, challenges 
may be brought to “test whether government regulation of 
property is fundamentally rational.”217 
As a general rule per Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution, no person may be deprived of his or her 
property rights without due process of law.218  However, private 
property owners are subject to certain limitations on their use of 
property. The first is the precept sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas.219  That is, use your own property as not to injure your 
neighbors.220  Zoning ordinances provide another limitation on 
the use of private property. Zoning ordinances were first 
developed in the early twentieth century “to combat the 
complexities of rapidly developing urban and industrial life.”221  
In Pennsylvania, as in all states, municipalities derive their 
authority to zone from the legislature. Specifically, the 
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code provides that “each 
municipality has the authority to enact, amend, and repeal 
 
 214. Id. See generally Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 215. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 
 216. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
 217. Robin Kundis Craig, Due Process Challenges, in PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 277, 290 (James R. May ed., 2011) (citing 
Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)). 
 218. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1001; see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men 
are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and 
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of 
pursuing their own happiness.”). 
 219. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1001. 
 220. Id. at 931. 
 221. Id. at 1002 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 
(1926)). 
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zoning ordinances.”222  As this is a grant of authority from the 
legislature to municipal governments, the General Assembly may 
withdraw the delegated authority subject to an important 
limitation. The withdrawal of a grant of authority must be 
constitutionally permissible.223  Thus, the issue for Justice Baer 
was, “May the General Assembly, through a law applicable 
statewide, remove en toto from local municipalities the apparatus 
it provided to vindicate the individual substantive due process 
rights of Pennsylvanian landowners?”224  He concluded that “once 
a state authorizes political subdivisions to zone for the best 
interests of the health, safety and character of their communities, 
and zoning ordinances are enacted and relied upon by the 
residents of a community, the state may not alter or invalidate 
those ordinances, given their constitutional underpinning.”225 
Justice Baer began his analysis by noting that in a “run of 
the mill” zoning case, a citizen challenges a local zoning 
ordinance as violating his or her property rights without due 
process of law.226  A challenger will succeed only if he or she can 
show that the government’s interference with the property 
owner’s right to enjoyment of his or her land does not bear “a 
substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare of the community.”227  Act 13, however, is unlike a typical 
zoning ordinance. Rather than limiting use of private property, 
Act 13 expands private property rights by mandating that 
municipalities permit residential and agricultural property 
owners to bring oil and gas operations onto their land.228  
Consequently, the government intrusion is not upon the 
landowner who wishes to have oil and gas operations on his or 
her property, but upon that landowner’s neighbors.229  Thus, “the 
 
 222. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1002 (quoting Hoffman Mining Co. v. Zoning 
Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., 32 A.3d 587, 603 (Pa. 2011)). 
 223. Id. at 1006. 
 224. Id. at 1002. 
 225. Id. at 1006. (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in the 
original). 
 226. Id. at 1004. 
 227. Id. at 1003 (quoting Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 108 
(Pa. 1977)). 
 228. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1005. 
 229. Id. 
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General Assembly is mandating that municipalities pass land-use 
and zoning ordinances, which permit landowners, statewide, to 
violate sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas”230 and which fail to 
provide impacted neighbors with “any remedy when the 
inevitable damage to the enjoyment of private property 
occurs.”231 
Federal case law teaches that constitutionally valid zoning 
“is to be determined . . . by considering [the restriction] in 
connection with the circumstances and the locality”232 and that 
“[l]and-use restrictions designate districts in which only 
compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are 
excluded.”233  Act 13 directly contradicts these edicts. That is, Act 
13 “violates substantive due process because it does not protect 
the interests of neighboring property owners from harm, alters 
the character of neighborhoods and makes irrational 
classifications” (e.g., it requires municipalities to allow drilling 
operations and the use of explosives in all zoning districts).234  
Contrary to Village of Euclid, “Sections 3215(b)(4) and (d), 3303, 
and 3304 not only allow entry of the pigs into the parlor, but 
further decree that local governments enact zoning ordinances 
that expressly permit those intrusions, without exception.”235 
For all of the reasons stated above, the lead and concurring 
opinions held that sections 3215(b)(4) and (d), 3303, and 3304 of 
Act 13 are unconstitutional.236  Additionally, the court enjoined 
certain specified parts of chapters 32 and 33, which implement or 
enforce these invalidated provisions.237  The lead opinion further 
directed the General Assembly to exercise its power in a manner 
that reasonably accounts for the environmental features of 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1008. 
 232. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
 233. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732 (1995) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
 234. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1006. 
 235. Id. at 1008; see also Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (“A nuisance may be 
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard.”). 
 236. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1008. 
 237. Id. at 916. 
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affected locales in accordance with principles of sustainable 
development.238 
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ATMOSPHERIC 
INTEGRITY 
Both Montana and Pennsylvania have constitutional text 
explicitly reserving a fundamental environmental right in the 
people. Despite the lack of corresponding text in the U.S. 
Constitution, the genesis of a federal right to atmospheric 
integrity may be found through historical, doctrinal, prudential, 
structural, and ethical analysis. I will begin, though, with a few 
words about the lack of textual support for a right to atmospheric 
integrity in the U.S. Constitution. 
A. Text 
Clearly, there is no explicit mention of atmospheric integrity 
in the U.S. Constitution.239  This absence is likely due to the 
founding fathers’ inability to imagine a world transformed by 
human activity. One commentator described the drafters of the 
Bill of Rights as “ecologically ignorant.”240  Certainly, the state of 
scientific knowledge in 1791 was less advanced than it is today. 
However, there is evidence that James Madison at least 
considered human impacts on the environment: “[I]t is difficult to 
believe that it lies with [mankind] so to remodel the work of 
nature as it would be remodelled [sic], by a destruction not only of 
individuals, but of entire species.”241  Madison insisted that the 
laws of nature forbade the destruction of entire species.242  
 
 238. Id. at 981. 
 239. Over the years, there have been unsuccessful attempts to add 
environmental rights to the constitution. See generally Carole L. Gallagher, The 
Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to 
the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107 (1997); Robin Kundis Craig, Should 
there be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 11013 (2004). 
 240. Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 160. 
 241. John F. Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison: Eighteenth-Century 
Species Protection and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 63 
MD. L. REV. 287, 316 (2004). 
 242. Id. at 291. 
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Whatever the drafters’ actual knowledge, given that the purpose 
of the constitution is to provide for society’s orderly progression 
through time “to ourselves and our posterity,” 243 it can be 
presumed that the founders believed that the physical world 
would and should remain in a state hospitable to human life. 
B. History 
As noted above, historical arguments are based on a 
construction of the original understanding of a particular 
constitutional provision. Where there is an absence of an explicit 
provision, one can look to the historical understanding of a 
concept. For example, when asked to determine whether a law 
prohibiting assisted suicide violated Due Process, the Court 
examined “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and 
practices.”244  I concede that it would be futile to assert that our 
nation has a history and legal tradition of atmospheric protection 
beyond those protections afforded by the Clean Air Act. If one 
considers that atmospheric integrity is essential for human 
subsistence, however, the question becomes whether our nation 
has a history of recognizing intergenerational responsibility. I 
assert that conceptions of intergenerational responsibility can be 
traced back to ancient Greece and take the form of both an 
obligation to refrain from unduly burdening future generations 
and to pass along to posterity a better, more stable society. 
During Aristotle’s time, every Athenian who wished to 
become a citizen was required to take an oath which stated, in 
relevant part, “[m]y native land I will not leave a diminished 
heritage but greater and better than when I received it.”245  The 
concept of intergenerational responsibility was also expressed in 
Roman law nearly 1,500 years ago. The text of the Institutes of 
Justinian declared that, “[b]y the laws of nature, these things are 
common to mankind – the air, running water, the sea, and 
 
 243. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 244. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997). 
 245. John Wilson Taylor, The Athenian Ephebic Oath, 13 THE CLASSICAL 
JOURNAL 495, 499 (1918), available at, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3287904. 
Aristotle lived from 384–322 B.C.E. Aristotle, HISTORY.COM, 
http://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/aristotle (last visited Dec. 20, 
2014). 
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consequently the shores of the sea.”246  This ancient 
pronouncement provides the foundation of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, which holds that the sovereign (i.e., the state) holds 
shared resources—the jus publicum—in trust for the public. 
Trustees have a fundamental, common law duty to preserve and 
maintain trust assets for both present and future beneficiaries of 
the trust.247 
Expressions of intergenerational obligations may also be 
found in American political discourse from the very earliest days 
of the union up until the present. For example, John Adams 
wrote that he studied the useful science of government so that his 
grandchildren could pursue more cultured disciplines, such as 
painting and poetry.248  Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 
also documented their thoughts on intergenerational obligations. 
Using land as an analogy for debt and civil law, Jefferson wrote 
to Madison, 
I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self evident, ‘that 
the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;’ that the dead have 
neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an 
 
 246. JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 158 (Thomas Collett Sandars ed. 
& trans., 1st Am. ed. 1876) (emphasis added). The Institutes of Justinian is one 
of three fundamental works of jurisprudence issued from 533 to 534 A.D by 
order of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian I. Collectively, the works were 
intended to be the sole source of Roman law. Roman law provides the foundation 
for our own Western legal tradition. See John W. Head, Codes, Cultures, Chaos, 
and Champions: Common Features of Legal Codification Experiences in China, 
Europe, and North America, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 38–39 (2003). 
 247. Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the World, in 
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 99, 106, 109 n.59 (Ken Coghill et 
al. eds., 2012). 
 248. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (May 12, 1780) (on file with in 
Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society), available at 
http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17800512jasecond&bc=
%2Fdigitaladams%2Farchive%2Fbrowse%2Fletters_1779_1789.php (“The 
Science of Government it is my Duty to study, more than all other Studies 
Sciences: the Art of Legislation and Administration and Negotiation, ought to 
take Place, indeed to exclude in a manner all other Arts. I must study Politicks 
and War that my sons may have liberty to study Painting and Poetry 
Mathematicks and Philosophy. My sons ought to study Mathematicks and 
Philosophy, Geography, natural History, Naval Architecture, navigation, 
Commerce and Agriculture, in order to give their Children a right to study 
Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Statuary, Tapestry and Porcelaine.” 
(alterations in original)). 
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individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts 
to the society. . . . Then no man can by natural right oblige the 
lands he occupied, or the persons who succeed him in that 
occupation, to the paiment [sic] of debts contracted by him. For if 
he could, he might during his own life, eat up the usufruct of the 
lands for several generations to come, and then the lands would 
belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be reverse 
of our principle.249 
Jefferson went on to assert that the current generation may 
not burden future generations with debt or with a perpetual 
constitution. He stated that a nation should not contract more 
debt that it can repay within a generation (the duration of which 
he calculated to be nineteen years).250  Similarly, he declared 
that, “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires 
at the end of 19 years.”251  In response, Madison attacked each of 
Jefferson’s proposals on practical grounds while generally 
accepting Jefferson’s objective to make constitutions sensitive to 
the majority will of each successive generation because, to do 
otherwise, would be “an act of force and not of right.”252  Madison 
observed that obligations may, indeed, pass from one generation 
to the next, but stipulated that future generations should not be 
unduly burdened by contemporary decisions.253  He wrote, “it 
would give me singular pleasure to see it first announced to the 
world in a law of the U. States, and always kept in view as a 
 
 249. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson 
Looney eds., 2008) (hereinafter “Letter Sept. 6, 1789”). Usufruct refers to “the 
legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of something belonging to 
another.” WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1299 (1984). 
 250. Letter Sept. 6, 1789, supra note 249. 
 251. Id. 
 252. ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 70, 
73 (1950) (quoting Letter Sept. 6, 1789, supra note 249). 
 253. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 437, 439, 441 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1904), available 
at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1937#lf1356-05_head_163 (“There seems, then, 
to be some foundation in the nature of things; in the relation which one 
generation bears to another, for the descent of obligations from one to another. 
Equity may require it. Mutual good may be promoted by it. And all that seems 
indispensable in stating the account between the dead and the living, is to see 
that the debts against the latter do not exceed the advances made by the 
former.”). 
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salutary restraint on living generations from unjust & 
unnecessary burdens on their successors.”254 
Thomas Paine similarly wrote in 1792 that, 
The Parliament or the people of 1688 . . . had no more right to 
dispose of the people of the present day, or to bind or to control 
them in any shape whatever, than the Parliament or the people of 
the present day have to dispose of, bind, or control those who are 
to live a hundred or a thousand years hence.255 
Jefferson, Madison, and Paine were all writing in a political 
context. It is not too far of a stretch to assert, though, that their 
command that one generation not unduly burden another is 
applicable to the nation’s response to climate change. Failure to 
act now to reduce atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases to levels 
compatible with climate stability will indeed “bind or control 
those who are to live a hundred or a thousand years hence.”256 
Nearly fifty years after Paine wrote The Rights of Man, 
Abraham Lincoln spoke to a group of students about positive 
responsibilities toward future generations. Specifically, he noted 
the duty 
to transmit [goodly land and a political edifice of liberty and 
equal rights], the former, unprofaned by the foot of an invader; 
the latter, undecayed by the lapse of time and untorn by 
usurpation, to the latest generation that fate shall permit the 
world to know. This task gratitude to our fathers, justice to 
ourselves, duty to posterity, and love for our species in general, 
all imperatively require us faithfully to perform.257 
President Barack Obama, likewise, invoked our society’s 
responsibility to future generations in his 2014 State of the Union 
Address. He stated, “when our children’s children look us in the 
eye and ask if we did all we could to leave them a safer, more 
 
 254. Id. at 441 (emphasis in original). 
 255. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE'S 
ATTACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 13 (Eckler 1892) (emphasis in original). 
 256. PAINE, supra note 255, at 13. 
 257. Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address 
before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 27, 1838), available 
at http://patriotpost.us/documents/57 (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
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stable world, with new sources of energy, I want us to be able to 
say yes, we did.”258  History and current discourse thus 
demonstrate both an obligation to refrain from unduly burdening 
future generations and to pass along a stronger, more stable 
society. 
History also tells us that Madison and his contemporaries 
accepted regulation of natural resources, specifically laws that 
required mill dam operators to accommodate migratory fish, as 
being broadly aimed at public utility and beneficial to the 
community at large.259  This perception is at odds with modern 
case law concerning regulatory takings.260  During Madison’s 
time, there was “wide consensus among contemporary legislators 
that the constitutional rights of affected landowners were not 
violated by accommodating the public’s interest in natural 
abundance, instead of sacrificing the public good in order to 
maximize the value of private property.”261  Accordingly, the fish-
passage laws and the broader concern for the public utility of 
natural resources that they reflect should be “recognized as part 
of the American legal tradition that was already established 
when the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted.”262  In 
other words, “the history of the early fish-passage laws should 
lead the Court to affirm ‘the constitutional power of the State to 
insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its 
citizens’ in the context of habitat preservation laws”263, including 
climate change laws and regulations. 
C. Doctrine 
Doctrinal arguments for constitutional rights are derived 
from precedent or from commentary on precedent. Admittedly, 
U.S. precedent supporting a constitutional environmental right is 
 
 258. President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/ 
president-barack-obamas-state-union-address. 
 259. Hart, supra note 241, at 315. 
 260. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 261. Hart, supra note 241, at 289. 
 262. Id. at 290. 
 263. Id. at 317 (quoting Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 
356–57(1908) (Holmes, J. delivered the opinion of the court)). 
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poor. Federal courts have consistently found that there are no 
constitutionally-protected environmental rights pursuant to the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.264  At least one 
federal court, however, has expressed its opinion that 
constitutional recognition of a fundamental right to 
environmental integrity may one day be recognized. In response 
to a cause of action claiming that, 
[t]he right to enjoy the beauty of God’s creation, and to live in an 
environment that preserves the unquantified amenities of life, is 
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States . . . and is 
also one of those unenumerated rights retained by the people . . . 
as provided in the Ninth Amendment, 265 
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
stated that “[s]uch claims, even under our present Constitution, 
are not fanciful and may, indeed, some day, in one way or 
another, obtain judicial recognition.”266  The court went on to 
state, however, that the plaintiffs had “not stated facts which 
would under the present state of the law constitute a violation of 
their constitutional rights.”267  Similarly, in a dissent to an 
opinion268 that denied standing to the Sierra Club to challenge 
the development of a ski resort in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, 
Justice Douglas implicitly recognized a basic right to a clean and 
healthy environment.269  These sympathetic responses indicate 
 
 264. Gallagher, supra note 239, at 117. 
 265. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of U. S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 
739 (D. Ark. 1971). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 269. Gallagher, supra note 239, at 110. In another case, Environmental 
Defense Fund Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., a federal judge wrote, “I have no 
difficulty in finding that the right to life and liberty and property are 
constitutionally protected. Indeed the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
provide that these rights may not be denied without due process of law, and 
surely a person's health is what, in a most significant degree, sustains life. So it 
seems to me that each of us is constitutionally protected in our natural and 
personal state of life and health. But the constitutional protection is against 
governmental action either federal or state.” Envtl. Def. Fund Inc. v. Hoerner 
Waldorf Corp., 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 20794, 20794 (D. Mont. 1970). As plaintiffs 
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that the notion of a fundamental right to environmental integrity 
is not without merit. 
As demonstrated by the holding in Robinson Township, 
precedent can be rejected, particularly when courts accept 
historical evidence of constitutional intent. After all, the doctrine 
of stare decisis is not an inexorable command.270  The court in 
Robinson Township looked to the legislative history of the 
Environmental Rights Amendment to determine that legislators 
and citizens intended that article 1, section 27 should compel the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to exercise its police power in a 
manner that fosters sustainable development while respecting 
the reserved rights of the people to a clean, healthy, and 
esthetically-pleasing environment.271  Similarly, courts should 
consider that James Madison—the author of the Bill of Rights, 
including the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment—accepted 
regulation of natural resources on private property for the benefit 
of the community at large. 272  Correctly understood, then, the 
takings clause should not be read as an impediment to the 
protection of environmental quality in the name of the public 
good. 
Courts are not strictly limited to domestic precedent, 
however. They may look to international law for respected 
reasoning and guidance. Per the authority of the Supremacy 
Clause,273 the Supreme Court has stated that “[i]nternational law 
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination” and that courts should refer to “customs and 
usages of [c]ivilized nations, . . . not for . . . speculations . . . 
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence 
of what the law really is.”274  Indirect incorporation of 
international law is an established and appropriate means of 
 
alleged no federal or state action in their pleadings, however, the opinion fell 
short of recognizing constitutionally-protected rights to a clean and healthful 
environment. Id.; see also Gallagher, supra note 239, at 113–14. 
 270. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). 
 271. See generally, Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
 272. Hart, supra note 241, at 315. 
 273. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 274. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
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guiding, interpreting and applying domestic law, particularly 
with regard to the broad, normative standards set by 
international human rights law.275  In fact, “[o]ver the years, a 
growing number of federal and state courts have referred 
explicitly to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration [of 
Human Rights] and other international human rights 
instruments to determine the content and contours of various 
rights guaranteed by U.S. law.”276 
There has been a “greening” of international human rights 
law such that human rights courts and treaty bodies are seeing 
an increase in environmental cases implicating human rights.277  
“Human rights law does not protect the environment per se.”278  
Rather, “the right to private life, or the right to life, can be used 
to compel governments to regulate environmental risks, enforce 
environmental laws, or disclose environmental information.”279  
The Office for the High Commissioner on Human Rights reported 
in 2009 that: 
[w]hile the universal human rights treaties do not refer to a 
specific right to a safe and healthy environment, the United 
Nations human rights treaty bodies all recognize the intrinsic 
link between the environment and the realization of a range of 
human rights, such as the right to life, to health, to food, to 
water, and to housing.280 
 
 275. HISKES, supra note 56, at 7 (“the concepts of human rights have 
increasingly been accepted as norms governing the behavior of states.”); Nickel, 
supra note 65, at 285; Popovic, supra note 14, at 373. 
 276. Popovic, supra note 14, at 369 (quoting Richard B. Lillich, The 
Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 859–60 
(1989)); see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (The Court looked 
to international law for guidance and determined that, “[t]he overwhelming 
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not 
controlling here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the 
Court's determination that the penalty is disproportionate punishment for 
offenders under 18.”). 
 277. Boyle, supra note 16, at 614. 
 278. Id. at 615. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 617 (citing U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the OHCHR on the 
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009)). 
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Thus, in considering whether there is a right to atmospheric 
integrity, courts should consider that international human rights 
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights281 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights,282 protect fundamental rights as well as the 
basic necessities of life that are threatened by catastrophic 
climate change. Under international law, the United States has 
assumed obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human 
rights.283  These responsibilities would be further heightened if 
the Court were to recognize a right to atmospheric integrity as an 
emergent human right.284 
Additionally, courts should consider international 
environmental declarations and conventions, including the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration of the Human Environment,285 the 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,286 and the 
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).287  By considering both international human rights 
and environmental law, courts may incorporate respect for basic 
and human rights, environmental integrity, and economic 
development into their decisions.288 
D. Prudence 
Prudential arguments take political and economic 
circumstances into account. Given the overwhelming evidence 
that human-caused climate change is imposing “current impacts 
with significant costs and extraordinary future risks to society 
 
 281. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (establishing the right to life, liberty and security 
of person). 
 282. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A(XXI) (Jan. 3, 1976) The U.S. has 
signed, but not ratified the resolution.. 
 283. What are Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2014). 
 284. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 288. See Boyle, supra note 16, at 627. 
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and natural systems,”289 and that the costs of inaction greatly 
outweigh the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions,290 the 
prudent course of action is to start reducing emissions 
immediately. A 2006 study revealed “[t]he benefits of strong, 
early action on climate change outweigh the costs.”291  In 
particular, the report estimated that failure to mitigate climate 
change will cost at least five percent—and maybe as much as 
twenty percent—of global gross domestic product (GDP) each 
year, “now and forever.”292  Ignoring climate change will damage 
economic growth and potentially create risks of major disruption 
to economic and social activity.293  As temperatures increase, 
aggregate economic damages will accelerate.294  Climate change 
is projected to slow economic growth, hinder poverty reduction 
efforts, erode food security, and prolong existing and create new 
poverty traps, particularly in urban areas and emerging hunger 
hotspots.295 
Alternatively, the cost of reducing emissions (i.e., mitigation) 
could be limited to one percent of global GDP each year.296  
Mitigation, with opportunities for growth and development along 
the way, therefore, represents a wise investment.297  Effective 
early action is “the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it 
can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth 
of rich or poor countries.”298  Thus, climate science299 and 
economic analysis both provide prudential arguments for 
immediate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
 289. AAAS, supra note 1, at 1. 
 290. NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at 
vi (2006). 
 291. STERN, supra note 290, at i. 
 292. Id. at vi. 
 293. Id. at ii. 
 294. IPCC 2014, supra note 1, at 13. 
 295. Id. at 21. 
 296. STERN, supra note 290, at vi. 
 297. Id. at i. 
 298. Id. at viii; cf. Independence Hall Ass’n, The Electric Ben Franklin, 
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/franklin/quotable/quote67.htm (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014). This argument may also be phrased in terms of an 
historical argument by referencing Benjamin Franklin’s famous adage that an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. 
 299. See supra Part II. 
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E. Ethical 
Ethical arguments reflect the character or ethos of the 
American polity and compel solutions that comport with “the sort 
of people we are.”300  The American identity is defined largely by 
individualism.301  This notion must be tempered, however, by our 
nation’s Judeo-Christian heritage, which teaches social 
responsibility. For example, Jewish theology teaches that there 
are ethical obligations for the living to “live equitably within the 
boundaries of what the Earth can sustain” and an obligation to 
extend that process to generations of humans and nonhumans 
still unborn. 302  Christian teachings similarly invite 
environmental stewardship. For example, A Southern Baptist 
Declaration on the Environment and Climate Change invokes 
scripture to motivate climate action: “We must care about 
environmental and climate issues because we are called to love 
our neighbors, to do unto others as we would have them do unto 
us and to protect and care for the ‘least of these.’”303  Likewise, 
Catholic teachings indicate that “creation is the beginning and 
the foundation of all God’s works” and, consequently, “[t]he 
environment must be seen as God’s gift to all people, and the use 
we make of it entails a shared responsibility for all humanity, 
especially the poor and future generations.”304 
I include these references here not to blur the line between 
church and state. Rather, I seek to demonstrate that accepting 
shared responsibility for the physical world and vulnerable 
populations, including those yet to be born, is consistent with 
 
 300. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 95. 
 301. Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 170. 
 302. Lawrence Troster, Judaism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY, 
VOL. 1: THE SPIRIT OF SUSTAINABILITY 255 (Willis Jenkins, ed. 2010). 
 303. A Southern Baptist Declaration on the Environment and Climate Change, 
SOUTHERN BAPTIST ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.baptist 
creationcare.org/node/1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (citing Matthew 22:34–40; 
7:12; 25:31–46). 
 304. Pope Benedict XVI, Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for the 
Celebration of World Peace Day (Jan. 1, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf_b
en-xvi_mes_20091208_xliii-world-day-peace_en.html#_edn1 (last visited Dec. 20, 
2014)). 
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“millennia of moral teaching.”305  In Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice 
Burger observed in a concurring opinion that “[t]o hold that the 
act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental 
right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”306  
While Bowers was overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, Justice 
Burger’s reasoning is relevant to the articulation of a right to 
atmospheric integrity.307  Concern for the well-being of creation 
and vulnerable populations is “firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian 
moral and ethical standards”308 of Western civilization and, thus 
defines “the sort of people we are.”309  Furthermore, the Lawrence 
court reasoned that changes in the laws and traditions of the past 
fifty years were of greater relevance and “show[ed] an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”310  There has been no comparable change in 
Judeo-Christian attitudes toward social responsibility: the 
millennia of moral teachings continue to be affirmed.311  
Additionally, concepts of intergenerational equity have “deep 
roots in the religious, cultural, and legal traditions of the 
 
 305. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 308. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 309. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 94–95. 
 310. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
 311. Philip Pullella, Pope Francis Preparing Encyclical on the Environment, 
Vatican says, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2014/01/25/pope-francis-envionment_n_4662499.html (“[Pope Francis,] 
who took his name from the saint seen as the patron of the animals and the 
environment, is writing an encyclical on man's relationship with nature.”). See 
also, Peter Adriance, Faith Communities Stress Moral Dimension of Carbon 
Pollution at EPA, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2014, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-adriance/faith-communities-stress-_b_47 
69649.html; see generally CATHOLIC CLIMATE COVENANT, http://catholicclimate 
covenant.org/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Mission & History, INTERFAITH POWER 
& LIGHT, http://www.interfaithpowerandlight.org/about/mission-history/ (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2014) (stating that Interfaith Power & Light seeks to combat 
global warming through the promotion of energy conservation, energy efficiency, 
and renewable energy); About GreenFaith, GREENFAITH, http://greenfaith.org/ 
about (last visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
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world.”312  As such, the concept is also familiar to Americans from 
non-Judeo-Christian backgrounds. 
F. Structural 
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are co-equal 
branches of government. Within this scheme, it is “emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”313  Thus, the Supreme Court has the authority to 
articulate constitutional rights. Once such rights are recognized, 
it is also the judiciary’s duty to “to see to it that no right secured 
by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed by 
legislation.”314  Courts are thus “uniquely qualified to recognize 
and safeguard important principles and values.”315 
The right to atmospheric integrity such that the climate does 
not shift beyond the relatively stable range of the Holocene epoch 
(i.e., the last 10,000 years) during which modern human society 
has evolved is surely an important value worth safeguarding. The 
current Congress is ineffective, if not outright hostile, in its 
efforts to craft a meaningful response to climate change. There is 
a profound disconnect between scientific knowledge and public 
perception about the risk of highly damaging impacts of climate 
change.316  Ninety-seven percent of climate scientists agree that 
human-caused climate change is occurring.317  In light of this 
strong degree of scientific consensus, it is astounding that over 
half of the Republican members of the House of Representatives 
(fifty-five percent) and Senate (sixty-six percent) reject human-
 
 312. Weiss, Intergenerational Equity, supra note 77, at 8–9 (citing Islamic law, 
Judeo-Christian tradition, European and American civil law, socialist legal 
tradition, African customary law, and non-theistic traditions, such as Shinto). 
 313. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 314. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 528 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942). 
 315. Dernbach, supra note 6, at 733. 
 316. AAAS, supra note 1, at 3. 
 317. Emily Atkin, This One Simple Graphic Explains the Difference Between 
Climate Science and Climate Politics, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2014, 1:38 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/03/27/3419542/climate-science-vs-
climate-politics-graphic/ (“[O]f 10,855 climate studies published in peer-reviewed 
journals during 2013, 2 rejected anthropogenic global warming.”). 
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cause climate change.318  Consequently, there is little hope for an 
effective response to climate change from current federal 
legislators. 
The executive branch has a more positive record on climate 
change319 and is currently developing regulations to limit 
emissions from power plants per its authority under the Clean 
Air Act.320  The executive branch’s efforts alone are inadequate to 
meet the scope of the challenge presented by climate change, 
however. Into this void, the Court may establish a constitutional 
right to atmospheric integrity based on the arguments presented 
here. 
Once established, it would be the duty of the legislative and 
executive branches to create and implement a coherent strategy 
for action that incorporates consideration for atmospheric 
integrity into all governmental decisions.321  The courts would 
retain responsibility for weighing the protection of atmospheric 
integrity against other equally valid and necessary constitutional 
protections, particularly property rights. The end result will 
necessarily be, as in Robinson Township, an emphasis on 
sustainable development wherein economic development must be 
reconciled with natural resources protection. 
In vindicating a constitutional right to atmospheric integrity, 
the judiciary could impose requirements for 1) production of a 
national climate recovery plan to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions nationwide at a rate of six percent per year, and 2) an 
annual accounting from the federal government in which the 
executive branch documents the nation’s annual emissions and 
progress toward reaching the six percent per year reduction 
 
 318. Id. 
 319. See e.g., Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, 
Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819 (Nov. 6, 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
UNITES STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2014 (2014); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionpl
an.pdf. 
 320. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 
(Dec. 15, 2009) (“The Administrator finds that six greenhouse gases taken in 
combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare of current 
and future generations.”); see also Adriance, supra note 311. 
 321. See Dernbach, supra note 6, at 726. 
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target.322  Given the necessary requirements for oversight and 
scientific literacy that such an equitable solution would require, 
the judiciary may want to establish a specialized climate court to 
handle the complicated task. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court has recognized that “the full scope of the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or 
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere 
provided in the Constitution.”323  Indeed, the Court has 
repeatedly recognized new fundamental liberty rights.324  It is 
now time for the Court to recognize a right to atmospheric 
integrity. Our nation’s history, traditions, and ethos provide 
evidence of “deeply rooted”325 intergenerational obligations, 
which impose both positive and negative duties on the present 
generation (i.e., do not unduly burden future generations and 
provide a strong, more stable society for future generations). 
Precedent embraces the precept that property rights must be 
exercised in such as manner as not to injure neighbors (i.e., sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas). If one considers neighbors in 
time, as well as neighbors in geographic space, the same principle 
may be used to restrain current exploitation of carbon resources. 
Additionally, international law reflects broad, normative 
standards that human rights, environmental integrity, and 
economic development should be balanced. Also, more than half of 
the world’s constitutions—and nearly all that have been adopted 
since 1972—include a constitutional provision regarding 
environmental quality.326  The international trend is, thus, 
toward greater legal recognition of environmental rights. 
 
 322. See National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA (Apr. 5, 2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html (stating 
that the EPA currently maintains an inventory of total annual U.S. greenhouse 
gas emissions and removals). 
 323. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). 
 324. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 325. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
 326. May, supra note 90, at 114; see also, Dernbach, supra note 6, at 697 
(“Nearly all national constitutions adopted or revised since 1972 have included a 
constitutional right to a decent environment.”). 
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Science and economics indicate that the prudent course 
forward—in order to maintain a world in which liberty and 
justice are possible327—is to immediately begin reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Science also provides a “careful 
description”328 to orient policymakers in their efforts to protect 
the asserted right. That is, returning to a concentration of less 
than or equal to 350 ppm of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will 
likely “stabilize climate without further global warming.”329  
Thus, once a right to atmospheric integrity is established by the 
Court, under its duty to “say what the law is,”330 annual targets 
are available as “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking”331 by 
the judicial, executive, and legislative branches, as well as by the 
private sector. 
By securing a fundamental right to atmospheric integrity, 
the United States could become a leader in the global response to 
climate change and, by example, lead other nations in a 
transition to a low-carbon economy. As the Robinson Township 
court found, the way forward must reconcile economic 
development with the conservation of natural resources. One 
state’s actions will not be sufficient, though. The nation, indeed 
the world as a whole, must embrace sustainable development 
such that we can meet our current needs without jeopardizing the 
ability of future generations to do the same. While the challenges 
are great, we need to focus on the goal of climate stability. As 
James Madison observed many years ago: 
it is so much easier to descry the little difficulties immediately 
incident to every great plan, than to comprehend its general & 
remote benefits, that further light must be added to the Councils 
of our Country before many truths which are seen through the 
medium of Philosophy, become visible to the naked eye of the 
ordinary politician.332 
 
 327. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (Fundamental rights are “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 328. Id. at 703, 721, 724. 
 329. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
 330. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 331. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003). 
 332. Hunt, supra note 253, at 441. 
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Until such time as politicians open their eyes to the 
challenges and opportunities presented by climate change, the 
courts have a crucial role in defining and defending the right to 
atmospheric integrity. 
 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2
